

tions and accomplishments of unwanted, illegitimate children.

Because the fetus is a human being, he should be accorded the same rights that other human beings enjoy. Maryland's current law already accommodates the real concerns for the health of the mother of an unborn child; the present bill would give her the power of life or death over another member of our society one who lives within her and depends on her for defense. Such power would be given to any pregnant girl or woman by this proposed bill.

H.B. 100 allows abortion upon the request of the mother up to twenty weeks after conception, and thereafter only if it "is deemed necessary in the judgment of the treating physician." This is a distinction without a difference. Any time requirement is illusory rather than real. Rarely does a girl know exactly when she became pregnant and, even if she does, what's to prevent her from lying about when she got pregnant? What it boils down to is this: any pregnant female may obtain an abortion if she finds a doctor who will agree to do it. Is this something our consciences can live with?

You and I share in the privilege and responsibility of formulating public policy and making laws for our fellow men. Without trying to be exhaustive about good lawmaking, I wish to criticize this bill from the point of view of what must go into a good law. It seems to me a law dealing with such a complex social, biological, economic and moral issue ought to have these characteristics:

First, it should reflect the best medical and scientific judgment available. We deal with human life at its beginning. If the physicians and scientists tell us—as they do—that the fetus, at say, 15 weeks, is definitely a *human person*, how can we kill that human person without guilt? This is the hardest question to answer in the abortion argument, but one we must face up to: if biological science declares that a 15-week-old fetus is a person, then our law can allow intentionally killing such an innocent person only when another human life is at stake. This bill, by permitting abortion up to twenty weeks would make legal the killing of fetuses which science tells us are *undoubtedly* human persons, and which, in many cases, would even be viable. There are numerous instances when such aborted children have lived.

Second, a good law does not help solve one social problem by creating others. Besides the problem of the unborn, unwanted child, we have the problem of "back-alley" abortions and the problem of death or injury to the aborting mother through improper surgical techniques. The New York experience since last July indicates that a so-called "liberalized" abortion bill does not solve these: it creates an "abortion mentality" which fosters thousands of unnecessary abortions and it appears there have been more deaths than before, rather than fewer. We should not go down New York's road until we have time to study their experience and see where that road leads.

Another problem in Maryland is the increasing difficulty of adoption. The "demand" by would-be adopting parents, I understand, far surpasses the "supply" of babies. Instead of encouraging and legalizing unnecessary abortions, perhaps we should by tax credits or subsidies during pregnancy, help the woman to carry her child to term and then put him up for adoption. We should also adopt a more compassionate attitude toward the unwed mother.

Third, a good law should harmonize the rights of all interested parties. Here the proposed bill completely overlooks the uncontroversial fact that the child in the womb is not just a growth in someone's body, like tonsils or an appendix, but is a real human being who, in my opinion, has the right to life. According to inheritance law and tort law, that child has legal rights and should

have the right to not be deprived of life and liberty without due process of law. The father also has rights in this matter: indeed, the bill before you creates the anomaly that the father might have to pay, involuntarily, a \$500 medical fee to a doctor for killing his child. Your bill does not even require his written consent. The parents of the unwed, minor mother have similar interests, but they are not even mentioned in the proposed bill.

Fourth, a good law should not foster crimes or put honest people into impossible crises of conscience. Under similar laws in other states and in England, frequently an intended abortion results in the birth of a living child. Nurses are told to put him into a bucket and toss him into the incinerator. Thus the public policy of the given jurisdiction actually promotes what its laws define as *manslaughter*—and requires conscientious hospital personnel to witness or even help in the killing of a living human being, contrary to all their training, instincts, and moral convictions.

Fifth, a good law respects the common morality of a pluralistic community. We are not talking about contraception here; we are talking about killing—not just "obtaining," as the Act euphemistically puts it—a baby *after* conception. A large segment of the people of Maryland—and I am included in that group—believe this proposed law would legitimize the killing of other human beings. To allow this "on demand," is to depart from the common law tradition which allowed the killing of other persons only in self-defense situations; or, more recently, in the strict therapeutic-abortion situations where the actual physical life of the mother was certain to be jeopardized by the pregnancy's continuance.

This Act would change that common morality and require a good portion of our population to collaborate, indirectly through their taxes, in what our criminal code punishes as the worst of all possible crimes.

Sixth, the right to live is as basic a right as one could imagine. How far will we go? As a result of the abortion mentality arising in this country, I am told a bill has been introduced in Florida to permit the euthanasia of the elderly under certain conditions. The arguments of population-control, in many people's minds, apply to anyone "unfit to live." We are close to Huxley's *Brave New World*—a very dangerous and inhumane place to live—when we declare by statute that two persons in a doctor's office can decide who shall live and who shall die, with often the sole motive being only the personal convenience of one of them.

Seventh, and finally, a good law emerges out of sound common sense and not emotionalism. At the outset I acknowledged the sincerity of this bill's proponents and I reiterate that acknowledgement now; but it is common knowledge that emotionalism plays a good part in the pressure for this bill. One aspect of it is the population-control argument; yet demographers tell us that our population growth, probably because of contraception, is practically stable. And in any event, in the U.S. the problem is not numbers of people but distribution of those people. Two-thirds of this country is practically empty of people, while they leave the farms and small towns and pile into the cities. We need an incentive policy to encourage the repopulation of the rural areas—not abortion-on-demand. . . . Another argument is women's rights—but, appealing as it is, it is unrealistic to make this point in a vacuum, without considering biological and legal truths which remind us that the unborn child also has rights. Yes, let's be attentive to women's rights, but what about baby's rights? Who speaks for those unborn constituents? In a very real sense I am here today testifying for that unrepresented group of humanity who has no lobby group, who

can't write you letters. They ask nothing more from you than what is their basic right—the most cherished right that any of us possess—the right to life.

Some time ago, we were all shocked to see on television pictures of grown men killing baby seals by beating them to death with clubs. Our shock and disgust were justified. But what about the destruction of human babies? Haven't they more worth than baby seals? It is sad that we cannot get the conservationists aroused over destruction of human life. The burning by saline solution, the dismembering, the torture and agony of the tiny, but sensitive, fetus are so real and so revolting that one hesitates to describe them. But the scientists assure us that the cry of an unborn infant is still a shriek of pain even if it is muffled, and it should be on the consciences of the legislators and citizens as much as it is on the ears of the nurses and doctors who hear these shrieks.

Can you treat life so recklessly, so callously? Can you give legal sanction to those who would disregard the dignity and very life of one human being for the convenience of another?

This legislation is not worthy of our past and is a disservice to our future.

I urge you, I plead with you, in the name of humanity, in the name of those unborn innocents whose death warrant you would be signing, to defeat this bill.

CUBA-SOVIET LAUNCHING PLATFORM

HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, January 29, 1971

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, the following two articles concerning the Soviet presence in Cuba should be of great interest to everyone who is interested in such things as Soviet presence.

Cuba becomes a substantial strategic threat to the people of the United States when integrated into the Soviet psycho-political and nuclear military warfare operations plan. One well-informed commentator has aptly termed Cuba a "900-mile-long launching platform."

Allowing the Soviets to acquire significant military and political advantages is not going to lead to the reduction of tensions as some sources would have us believe. Tensions arise directly from Soviet goals and activities directed toward achieving these goals to which all Americans who are in favor of national sovereignty and a free society are in absolute opposition. To permit the Soviets to obtain operational bases off the coast of Florida, which increases the scope and intensity of their tension-producing activity, is contrary to the entire concept of reducing tensions.

For those interested in preventing a nuclear war, especially one which introduces the North American Continent into the strategic equation as the primary battlefield, it should be quite clear that failing to oppose Soviet advances in the Caribbean is not particularly conducive toward this end.

The SALT talks will hardly become more productive if we allow the Soviets to maintain and fortify bases in Cuba which increase their strength. If Soviet unimpeded advance in the Caribbean can

January 29, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

E 293

in both Cambodia and Laos. In tandem with increased bombing strikes against North Vietnam, this does not spell de-escalation of the war.

It seems that "assurances" from the president means very little; it is naive to rely on mere assurances. Or to plead for more of them. We need more than pious assurances; we need some legal safeguards. Only Congress can supply those. When the apparent intent and spirit of an act such as the Cooper-Church resolution can be so callously perverted, then this administration has erected a credibility gap as frightening as anything preceding it, then the executive branch has scripted the stage when solemn treaties can be trampled upon as mere scraps of paper.

American "liaison" soldiers (not advisers!) have been photographed with our gunships on the ground in Cambodia. The excuses used by the Pentagon to try to justify the new policy are incredible inversions of logic and reason. There is no justification, so far, that is acceptable for resuming the bombings of North Vietnam. We think the administration is wrong if it believes the public and Congress will swallow, without question, the latest escalation of the war in Indochina under the illusion that it really means withdrawal from that war.

(From the Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1971)

CAMBODIA: TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES

At the top of the right hand column on this page today we are printing. For The Record, some pertinent excerpts from President Nixon's definitive speech on Cambodia last June and we suggest you glance at them before reading on. What you will discover, in comparing what Mr. Nixon promised with recent reports of official briefings in Saigon and Phnom Penh and recent pronouncements by the White House and the Secretary of Defense, is that the administration is not doing what it said it was going to do in Cambodia or is doing what it plainly promised it would not—even while steadfastly denying that it is doing anything of the sort.

The way or the other, we are once again not being told the truth about this war. And once again we are—all of us—suffering the consequences of dissembling—the disquiet which breeds dissent which prompts the congressional hearings which feed administration defensiveness; the breakdown of public trust and the imputations of disloyalty which fan debate; the political division which costs our efforts of their force by conveying irresolution to the enemy. The Nixon administration would have us believe that this is all the fault of the war critics but those who have been around this vicious circle more than ever in recent years are in little doubt about where the process begins. It begins with solemn pledges from the highest government officials which are not fulfilled. Then comes the fine print and the fancy rhetoric and the political finagling which cannot quite be put down—and probably shouldn't be—as up or even calculated deceit, but yet have that look. And so the value of the next pledge depreciates.

That is a senator or a citizen to make, for example, of today's reassurances of a strictly limited American role in Cambodia. Only seven months ago the President told us there would be "no U.S. ground personnel in Cambodia except for the regular staff of our embassy in Phnom Penh" and yet, a day or so ago, an Associated Press photographer caught sight of an American in combat dress running to a helicopter. The President tells us in June that there will be no U.S. advisers with Cambodian ground troops; in January they are shadowed hovering just overhead in helicopters, calling in air strikes, and there are reports of "military equipment delivery teams" at work.

In June, Mr. Nixon drew a careful distinction between U.S. air interdiction missions specifically aimed against efforts to reesta-

blish the Cambodian sanctuaries along the South Vietnam frontier and U.S. air support for South Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia. "There will be no U.S. air or logistics support," for these South Vietnamese operations, he declared emphatically. Yet, in January the Secretary of Defense disdains "semantics" and taunts the Congress with the promise that "as far as Cambodia is concerned . . . we will use air power, and as long as I am serving in this job, I will recommend that we use air power to supplement the South Vietnamese forces . . ." The simple fact of the matter seems to be that we are using air power, including close-in support from helicopter gunships, not just in support of the South Vietnamese in Cambodia, but in support of embattled Cambodians as well, anywhere local American commanders see a need to help the Cambodians with their own defense. And American military aid, of course, is no longer talked of in terms of \$5 million dollars for "small arms and relatively unsophisticated weapons"; already, it has ballooned into a mammoth, across-the-board, \$250-million affair.

The administration has an easy answer to all this, of course, which is that it is not violating any laws or exceeding the letter of congressional restraints and while this may be technically true, it is also beside the point. For if the President chooses to determine on his own that the fate of "Vietnamization" rests with the fate of Cambodia and that it all somehow relates to buying time for the safe withdrawal of American troops—if that is where we are now, by contrast with where we were in June—then he can probably get away with it, legally. But there is some fairly recent history that suggests this is an exceedingly dangerous business politically—and even military. The experience of the early days of President Johnson's stealthy expansion of our Vietnam effort surely tells us this. Yet Mr. Laird airily refused to deal in "semantics" and lets it go at that.

We doubt, somehow, that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will let it go at that when hearings on Cambodia get underway tomorrow. But we also hope that those proceedings do not bog down in tedious debate over congressional-vs-presidential prerogatives. What we need to know now is what happened between June and January and how we got where we are in Cambodia and why, and where we are headed. If this administration has learned nothing else about Vietnam, it should have learned by now that the truth, whatever it is, will be easier to live with than the consequences of not telling it.

OPPOSE BILL TO ALLOW ABORTION ON DEMAND

HON. LAWRENCE J. HOGAN

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, January 29, 1971

Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Speaker, on January 28, 1971, I presented testimony to the Maryland State Legislature opposing a proposed bill which would allow abortion on demand.

This is an issue of such great import on the National, State, and local levels that I insert the testimony I presented on that occasion at this point in the Record for the information of all Members:

I hope that Marylanders will rise up in righteous indignation and let their representatives in the State legislature know their opposition to this bill.

The testimony follows:

TESTIMONY OF U.S. CONGRESSMAN LAWRENCE J. HOGAN

My name is Lawrence J. Hogan. I live in Landover, Maryland, and represent the 5th District of Maryland in the U. S. House of Representatives.

I thank you for this opportunity to testify in opposition to H.B. 100, which is an "abortion-on-demand" bill. We are all aware of the tremendous public interest in this topic and of its very serious nature. Undoubtedly, this will be the most important piece of legislation before this Committee during the current session—and may well be the most important legislation before the entire legislature. If this bill passes, abortion in the State of Maryland will be practically unrestricted and a public policy stated that is permeated with serious social, economic, and moral problems.

One hundred and ninety-five years ago, Marylanders and other Americans joined hands and declared themselves a free people. In so doing, they set forth in writing a statement of the principles and attitudes which joined them together and which have ever since expressed the common philosophy of our Nation. The first of these principles, they wrote, is self-evident: all men are created equal. Early drafts of the Declaration of Independence had used the phrase "all men are born equal," but after considerable discussion, the framers of the document decided that they wanted to go on record as accepting that human beings possessed personal dignity, individual worth, and inalienable rights from the time of their creation—from the time of conception. This is history.

Today, in Maryland as elsewhere, that principle is under attack. I rise to defend it. In so doing, I do not mean to question the motives of those who disagree with me, or to demean their deep concern about personal and social problems.

The issues raised by H.B. 100 are no less important than those raised by the Declaration of Independence itself. H.B. 100 reflects its proponents' concern about the rights and health and comfort of pregnant girls and women. It does not, unhappily, treat the rights and health and comfort of other interested parties—most basically, the living unborn child within the womb. Nor does it treat the rights of the father of this new life . . . nor does it treat the concerns of the parents of the pregnant girl where she is a minor child. These omissions would not matter, however, if we could be certain that the life inside the womb was somehow not fully human. But the contrary is true! Scientific evidence is overwhelming that from a very few days after conception, the fetus is a full human person. His circulatory and digestive systems are his own. His genetic make-up is complete—and, incidentally, unique. It can never be duplicated. He is in no way a part of his mother and hence cannot or should not be treated as if he were, regardless of the intensity of his mother's wishes.

Of course, this fetus is tiny, and therefore vulnerable. He lacks full physical development, and may, in the eyes of some, be unattractive. His personality does not express itself in ways intelligible to most adults of his species, and so he may seem to have none. Are feebleness, unattractiveness, helplessness valid reasons for attack, rather than for defense?

Who among us can say this his conception was planned? That the news of his beginning was welcomed by his parents without question? Who can say for certain that he would even exist if it had not been for the protection of our customs and laws which have revered life at all its stages? The pages of human history are filled with contribu-

be achieved by talks in Europe then it is quite likely that the Soviets will drag out the talks in order to increase their real and material advance in this area.

The first article is by investigative reporter Paul Scott and appeared in Review of the News magazine of January 27, 1971, and the second was written by three well-known experts in the field of Latin American affairs, Dr. Manolo Reyes, Dr. Herman Portell-Villa, and Dr. Guillermo Belt, and appeared in the American Security Council's "Washington Report" for January 25, 1971.

The articles follow:

THE COMING CUBAN CRISIS
(By Paul Scott)

There is a difference as great as night and day between that highly reassuring public statement of President Nixon on Soviet naval activities in and around Cuba and the information gathered by U.S. Naval Intelligence.

While the President sees no Russian naval base in Cuba, our Navy is privately warning that for all intent and purpose the Soviets now have a base at Cienfuegos, Cuba, capable of handling missile-firing, nuclear submarines. The U.S. Navy also gathered hard evidence that the Cienfuegos base is partly operational and was used recently to service Russian submarines operating in the Caribbean.

This is the ominous conclusion of the latest Naval Intelligence estimate of Soviet naval capabilities and intentions in Cuba waters now being circulated at the highest levels of the Nixon Administration.

The highly classified document was prepared before President Nixon made his astonishing statement over nationwide TV while being interviewed by four network correspondents. In discussing Cuba and Soviet naval activities in the area, the President stated:

"Well, I can tell you everything our Intelligence tells us, and we think it's very good in that area because as you know, we have surveillance from the air, which in this case is foolproof, we believe."

"First, let's look at what the understanding is. President Kennedy worked out an understanding in 1962 that the Russians would not put any offensive missiles into Cuba. That understanding was expanded on October 11, this year, by the Russians when they said that it would include a military base in Cuba and a military Naval base. They, in effect, said that they would not put a military Naval base into Cuba on October the 11th."

"Now in the event that nuclear submarines were serviced either in Cuba or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding. That has not happened yet. We are watching the situation closely. The Soviet Union is aware of the fact that we are watching closely. We expect them to abide by the understanding. I believe they will."

"I don't believe that they want a crisis in the Caribbean and I don't believe that one is going to occur, particularly since the understanding has been clearly laid out and has been so clearly relied on by us, as I stated here today."

In sharp contrast to this Presidential "fig leaf," the highly classified Naval Intelligence document reveals that late in December a Soviet submarine tender operating from Cienfuegos, Cuba, carried out "servicing exercises" with three Russian submarines. The operational rendezvous of the Soviet surface ship with the submarines, including one nuclear powered sub, was the first of its kind for the Russians in Cuba waters. The bold "servicing exercises," photographed by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, took approximately

two hours and included the loading of supplies from the Soviet tender to one of the three submarines.

At least a dozen members of the submarine crew were exchanged during the operation. Those leaving the submarine were taken to Cienfuegos for "rest and recreation" or flown from Cuba back to the Soviet Union. Several high-ranking Soviet naval officers who had been flown to Cuba from the Soviet Union took part in the exercise.

Naval submarine analysts who studied the Intelligence estimate say the "servicing exercises" definitely show that the Soviets can and are planning to use Cienfuegos as a submarine operating base.

Although the actual rendezvous took place outside of Cienfuegos Harbor, all supplies transferred to the submarine from the Russian tender were first picked up at the Cuban port. This clearly indicates that the Kremlin plans to use Cuba as a major supply base in the Western Hemisphere. Soviet naval crews housed in barracks at Cienfuegos Harbor were used to load the supplies on the Soviet submarine tender. Several members of the Soviet land-based crew went aboard the tender and took part in the "servicing exercises."

In addition to the carefully planned supply operation, the submarine tender and the submarines were in direct radio contact with a newly built naval communication center at Cienfuegos. Cuban refugees report that the center is completely manned by Russians. The high-powered radio at Cienfuegos is already being used to transmit weather and coded messages to Soviet missile-firing submarines now believed to be stationed off the Atlantic Coast as well as in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.

The original copy of this Naval Intelligence estimate was forwarded to the White House during the recent holidays where Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's National Security Advisor, indicated that it would be carefully used in the formation of any Cuban action deemed necessary. Yet, while the Intelligence finding leaves no doubt that the Russians are using the Port of Cienfuegos as a submarine base, there has been no official determination of this at the White House policy-making level. All Naval officials involved in the drafting of the estimate have been able to learn that the estimate is now in the hands of Kissinger's foreign policy staff in the White House for "further analysis and study." No National Security Council meeting has been called to discuss its ominous implications.

President Nixon's unexpected TV statement on Cuba not only surprised and shocked Naval Intelligence officials, but they had no inkling that the President would discount the Soviet naval activities in the Cuba area, nor could they fathom his reasons for doing so. The President's statement highlights the often frightening gap that exists at times between those who have responsibility for gathering the facts and those who interpret them for use in policy-making.

The position the President is taking has been interpreted by these Naval officials as an indication that President Nixon and his policy-makers haven't been able to agree on what to do about the new Soviet threat. If they accept the hard facts of the Naval Intelligence estimate, it is pointed out, the President and his advisors must conclude that the Russians have double-crossed them and violated the "understanding" not to use Cuban ports or bases for their submarines. That finding might trigger a new U.S.-Soviet "confrontation" over the use of Cuba as a base for offensive weapons—a "confrontation" that the Nixon Administration apparently is not willing or ready to face at this time, or which it wants delayed for reasons that are only known at the White House level.

Significantly, Mr. Kissinger recently asked Secretary of State Rogers again to sound out the Soviets on whether the submarine tender now operating in Cuba's waters will permanently use Cuban ports. Naval intelligence officials say the answer is clear by the fact that the submarine tender has been operating out of Cuban ports for the past three months and another is en route to replace it.

Two other parts of President Nixon's statement on Cuba also bother officials at Naval Intelligence. One was his pronouncement that he believed the Russians would keep the "understanding" not to put a naval military base in Cuba. In effect, the President by saying this publicly was accepting the private assurances of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin over the hard facts gathered by the Navy. Yet, Gromyko and Dobrynin are both known to have lied to the late President Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. At the time the Russians were sneaking I.R.B.M.s and medium-range bombers into Cuba, Gromyko and Dobrynin were assuring Kennedy that the Soviets had no intention of putting offensive weapons on the island.

To most military Intelligence experts it is a little frightening that President Nixon would even consider discussing Cuba with the two Soviet diplomats after their earlier deceptions. And to accept their word now, as the President says he has, is considered folly of the most dangerous kind. Especially in light of the Intelligence that the President has access to on Soviet activities in Cuba.

The other disturbing statement by the President was his contention that U.S. surveillance of Cuba from the air is foolproof. None of the Intelligence services have claimed that. For months, Defense Intelligence officials have been urging that more use be made of Cuban refugees so that the government wouldn't be caught "off guard" as it was before the 1962 Cuban crisis. Despite the high degree of accuracy of new U.S. reconnaissance cameras and devices, they still can't determine what is hidden under camouflage facilities and in storage areas. It is pointed out that daily reconnaissance flights would be needed over Cuban ports to determine if any Soviet submarines were using them. Now, if there are two reconnaissance flights a week this is considered high. And still unknown to U.S. officials is what the Russians have succeeded in hiding in the hundreds of caves being used as military storage areas on the island.

This lack of vital intelligence about Soviet activities in Cuba is privately admitted by rank and file American Intelligence officers. They claim it is the result of policy restrictions placed on the methods they can use to gather information on Cuba. An example of these restrictions is the White House bar against financing Cuban refugee operations to gather firsthand data on Soviet activities on the island. White House aides take the position that this type of intelligence gathering is prohibited by the 1962 "understanding" on Cuba reached by U.S. and Soviet officials.

The only sure way that the U.S. can learn the full Soviet capability in Cuba, these Intelligence officials say, is to use anti-Castro refugees to do the spying. "As long as the policy-makers have the preconceived idea that Russia has no plans to use Cuba as a military base," stated one military Intelligence officer, "it is impossible to convince them that a round-the-clock surveillance of Cuba is needed."

There are increasing signs that the President's handling of Cuba is closely tied to his strategy for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (S.A.L.T.) with the Russians. Drafted by Presidential Aide Kissinger, the S.A.L.T. strategy calls for the U.S. to avoid

any direct confrontation with the Soviets until it can be determined if the Russians are serious about curbing defensive and offensive weapons delivery systems. Kissinger privately takes the position that a U.S. admission that the Russians now have an operational naval base in Cuba could trigger demands in Congress that immediate action be taken to force the Soviets out of Cuba.

Such a U.S.-Soviet confrontation in turn would force a complete breakdown of the SALT negotiations, which have been given the Administration's highest foreign policy priority. President Nixon is counting on reaching a missile agreement with the Soviets before the 1972 Presidential campaign.

During the recent Helsinki round of the SALT negotiations (November 2 to December 19), the Soviet delegation showed its diplomatic interest in Cuba. The Soviet negotiators noted that Russia had every right to put a military base in Cuba if she so desired. They contrasted a Soviet base in Cuba to U.S. bases in Europe or the Mediterranean. The inference was that the Russians would be willing to forego any Cuban base if the U.S. pulled its aircraft carriers out of the Mediterranean or gave up its air and naval bases in Spain. The Soviet negotiators' argument is in line with the main Russian SALT demand. It states that the U.S. must include its aircraft bases in Europe and aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean in any overall agreement covering both offensive and defensive weapons.

This use of Cuba as a SALT bargaining weapon clearly highlights the importance that the Kremlin attaches to its naval activities on that strategic Caribbean island. In light of this use of Cuba, Intelligence officials would like to see President Nixon adopt a more realistic view of what the Russians are up to in the Caribbean. Unless the President acts quickly, they see the Kremlin using Cuba to blackmail this country into either pulling its Naval forces out of the Mediterranean area or forcing the U.S. to make other concessions.

The American Intelligence community sees the Soviet naval base in Cuba as part of a network of naval bases the Russians are now establishing around the world. These include Mersa Matruh, and Alexandria, in Egypt; the Socotra Islands at the mouth of the Red Sea; and, a former French base in Algeria. The expanding Soviet navy also has acquired the right to use the Port of Modisio in Somaliland, Trincomalee in Ceylon, the Maldives Islands in the Indian Ocean, and one or more ports in Nigeria.

The establishment of this network of bases by the Soviets is being cited by Intelligence officials as evidence that the Kremlin has adopted a forward military strategy designed to control the strategic waterways of the world. This forward strategy also will permit the Soviet's missile-firing nuclear submarines to remain on stations constantly within the defenses of the U.S. and other N.A.T.O. nations. Its potential for blackmail, alone, is enormous!

Viewed in this light, the construction of the Cienfuegos base in Cuba is an even more ominous development than the attempted deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuban bases in 1962.

The Cienfuegos base would be needed if really large numbers of nuclear submarines were to be continuously off the coast of the United States. That is the true threat of the base. Which suggests in turn that the Soviets are now planning continuous deployment of very large numbers of "Yankee" class and other nuclear submarines in the Caribbean and along the American coast. The Cienfuegos operation reveals an undoubted Soviet intention to gain a solid "capability" to knock out the Panama Canal and the entire land-based bomber component of the U.S. deterrent, plus the controls of the "Safeguard" A.M. system.

The most horrifying single aspect of the story of the Cienfuegos base is still the response with which the bad news was met at the White House and in Congress. Consider a simple comparison. In 1962, the Congress was in flames over reports of Soviet missiles in Cuba, even before the presence of those missiles was confirmed by U-2 reconnaissance photographs. Contrast this with the near Congressional silence that has engulfed the news from Cienfuegos ever since it first came out that the Russians were building a base there.

And then think of the Nixon Administration's response to this news, that is even more alarming! Consider President Nixon's reassuring statement that the Russians have no plans of doing what our Intelligence people say they are doing.

The obvious intent was, and is, to prevent the American public from growing alarmed, when we should be deeply alarmed. The question each of us should personally ask the White House and our Representatives in Congress is: Why is the full story of Soviet activities in Cuba being withheld from the public?

If enough of us raise our voices, we can force the Nixon Administration to take the necessary measures to dismantle the Soviet nuclear submarine base in Cuba before it is used as a serious blackmail threat!!

One wonders what the outcome of the first Cuban missile crisis would have been if the late President Kennedy had delayed the Naval blockade of Cuba and warning to the Russians until after the Soviets had their missiles operational. How serious would Soviet blackmail have become? Intelligence leaks, some of them by the same sources that provided information for this article, forced Kennedy to act sooner than he originally had planned. Many involved in the first Cuban missile crisis believed that had Mr. Kennedy delayed his blockade decision a week or ten days the outcome would have been different.

What does Mr. Nixon's procrastination mean? Certainly no answer comforting to those concerned about American security is possible!

CIENFUEGOS: THE TIP OF THE SOVIET ICEBERG IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

(A Report by the Cuban Watch Committee
on Cuba)

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—This analysis which assesses the strategic implications of the stepped-up level of Soviet activity in Cuba, has been released by three respected members of the growing Cuban community of 600,000 persons who have been forced into exile in the United States by Castro's Communist government. It takes into account numerous intelligence reports, including those reaching them from various Cuban underground sources which in the past have proven reliable, and evaluates them against the broad background of their own personal experience in the fields of diplomacy, international law, politics, education, economics, and public affairs.)

SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY NOT CONFINED TO CIENFUEGOS

Since mid-1968 Cuban underground sources have been reporting regularly on Russian progress in converting Cienfuegos, on the southern coast of Cuba, into a key Soviet naval base in the Caribbean.¹ However, this did not come to the attention of the American public until a Soviet naval flotilla visited there on September 9-12, 1970. This event forced the White House to remind the USSR of the 1962 agreement between President Kennedy and Premier Krushchev that peace in the Caribbean could only be assured if Soviet nuclear missiles and bombs

were not reintroduced into the Hemisphere. This incident itself is but one aspect of the greatly accelerated over-all Russian military program in Cuba. Reports from the underground which underline its alarming scope include:

The Soviet plan to develop the island of Cuba into a major naval operating base. This involves the modernization of the harbors of Nipe, Caribarion (Cayo Frances), Matanzas, Havana, Mariel, Cabanas, and Baha Honda, all on the northern coast, and Santiago de Cuba and Cienfuegos on the southern coast. Mariel, 20 miles west of Havana, already has submarine pens that are operational; construction crews are working day and night at Cabarion and at Cayo Alcatraz in Cienfuegos Bay. Two Soviet admirals and three high-ranking civilian engineers were flown there non-stop from Russia in the long-range Soviet TU-95 Bear aircraft, the first week of December, 1970, to supervise the naval construction program.

In accordance with an agreement reached on January 8, 1969, between the USSR and Communist Cuba, the Nuclear Institute in Managua reportedly is now staffed with some 760 Soviet technicians. One noncritical nuclear plant is said to be already in operation and a second, capable of producing military quality fissionable material, is expected to become operational during this year.²

As of September, 1970, the Soviet Army strength in Cuba was estimated by the Cuban underground to be between 20,000 and 22,000 soldiers. They conduct regular maneuvers in Pinar Del Rio province, in the mountains near Candelaria, San Cristobal and San Diego on the Rosario Sierra.

An important Soviet Army military complex is being developed in the mountains at La Cubilla, near the towns of Cumanayagua and Seibabo, complete with electrified wire fences, pill-boxes, trenches, artillery emplacements and mysterious mounds covering entrances to underground installations. No Cuban is allowed to enter this area; the construction has been carried out entirely by Russian troops.

Soviet Army engineers have constructed a modern, eight-lane military highway from Havana and San Antonio de los Baños to Cienfuegos and are maintaining and improving the 400 mile stretch of strategic road from Cienfuegos to Santiago.

SOVIET MILITARY INSTALLATIONS GOING UNDERGROUND TO AVOID U.S. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE

Having learned a lesson in 1962 when the U-2 photographs foiled their effort to smuggle nuclear missiles into Cuba, all Soviet military installations, except those naval facilities which cannot be placed underground, are being built in caves or tunnels interconnecting the caves. Cuba has more than 3,000 natural or man-made caves which the Russians have already inventoried and explored. Marshal Grechko, the Soviet Defense Minister, visited many of these caves himself during his visit to Cuba in November, 1969. These provide the Soviets' answer to U.S. photographic surveillance of the island.

Ninety percent of the fuel reserves in Cuba are underground as are the major ammunition depots. Underground hospitals have been built at the Sierra de Cristal, near the Nipe and Levisa Bays in Oriente province, and in la Loma de San Vincente just off the road which runs between Santiago de Cuba and Guantanamo. Of particular importance are the various underground complexes lying within the quadrangle formed by Minas de Bajurayabo, Jaruco, Herradura and Mariel. Included in this area is the Nuclear Institute at Managua. Other locations where caves have been reinforced with concrete linings of up to six feet are the Sierra de Lupe, Oriente province; the Altura Central on the Isle of

¹ Broadcast by Radio Free America of the American Security Council, July 11, 1968.

² See "Washington Report" No. 68-6, February 10, 1969.

January 29, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—*Extensions of Remarks*

E 297

Pines which contains a number of large marble caves ideally suited for underground installations.

Underground missile bases are reported in the mountains of the Gobernadora, near Mariel; in Manicaragua, Las Villas province, at a place the Russian soldiers call "La Campana"; at San Cristobal and in the Sierra de los Organos in Final del Rio province. The latter has been of considerable interest to the Russians for some time. In April, 1969, eight extremely heavy, square wooden boxes were unloaded at night from Soviet ships at the Casablanca Arsenal docks under maximum security precautions, placed on large, 20-wheel flatbed trucks and driven off in a Soviet Army convoy in the direction of the Sierra de los Organos. This operation was repeated the last week in January, 1970, when another eight boxes, each 32 by 9½ by 13 feet, with a peaked, roof-like construction running lengthwise, were loaded on large trailers and convoyed by Soviet troops toward the same destination.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of our analysis of these reports, the "Watch Committee on Cuba" has reached several significant conclusions:

1. Soviet activities in Cuba suggest a sense of urgency which prompts them to accept increasing tensions with the US in order to achieve their goals.

2. The importance of Cuba as the prime Soviet base for directing Communist activities in the Western Hemisphere has increased and justifies a higher level of Soviet military investment.

3. While recognizing that their increased level of military activity in Cuba cannot be completely concealed, the Soviets are making every effort to hide the full scope of their program from the U.S.

4. As "hard" intelligence becomes more difficult to acquire, greater attention must be given to reports from the Cuban underground and to developing a more realistic assessment of Soviet revolutionary strategy for Latin America.

5. There are signs that the Soviets, emboldened by their greatly increased strategic nuclear capabilities since 1962, including their newly acquired, but fast growing Polaris-type submarine fleet may be preparing for a new test of will with the US involving another experiment in *fait accompli* nuclear power politics.

6. Should the President of the United States be confronted with a new Cuban missile crisis, he will find that the stakes are even higher, the hard photographic evidence of Soviet military capabilities will not be available, and his room for maneuver considerably reduced by the new balance of strategic power.

BOLDNESS, THE KEY TO SOVIET POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

Although Khrushchev takes credit for conceiving the missile gambit and for presenting it, as Premier, to the Politbureau, he emphasizes that the decision to pursue this dangerous course was an act of collective leadership. This is borne out by his candid admission (made to Dr. A. McGhee Harvey in 1969) that after the U-2 crisis in the spring of 1960, he was no longer "calling the shots"; that after Powers was shot down, his own ascendancy during the next four years was over. Thus the policies followed by the USSR during this perilous period were not in any sense imposed by Khrushchev upon his colleagues in the Kremlin as Stalin might have done, but were indeed a coldly calculated collective acceptance of the risks inherent in his proposal.

CHANGES AFFECTING THE POLITBUROU'S ASSESSMENT OF THE CUBAN SITUATION IN 1971

While undoubtedly there are wider considerations affecting Soviet foreign policy than

those cited below—for example, intellectual unrest at home, economic unrest within the European satellites, and the continuing possibility of a war with Communist China—the Watch Committee believes the following changes which have occurred since 1962 have an important bearing on the Politbureau's assessment of the Cuban situation to-day:

The balance of strategic nuclear power in the world has shifted, just as Khrushchev had predicted, in favor of the Soviet Union. Consequently the U.S. would be even less likely than before to risk nuclear war with the USSR.

Communism now has a base on the continent of South America—Chile. But, like Castro, Allende's government faces attack by enemies from within and without.

The Castro regime, unable to solve ever its own internal economic problems, has lost the support of the overwhelming majority of the Cuban people, including the rank and file of Castro's army. The possibility of internal revolt within the coming year cannot be discounted.

The forces of revolution in Latin America, particularly in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia are ripe for Communist exploitation provided the continental base in Chile can be maintained.

As a result of the protracted Vietnam War, the U.S. public has forced the Administration to announce a policy of non-involvement in local conflicts in the less developed areas of the world.

OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR POLITBUROU CONSIDERATION IN 1971

The Watch Committee wishes to emphasize that a Soviet policy of boldness paid off in 1962 and that today's balance of power would tend to encourage rather than inhibit new Russian adventures in brinkmanship. The expanded Soviet military program for Cuba clearly involves improving the USSR's nuclear capabilities in the Western Hemisphere.

In the discussions on Cuba between Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko on October 19, followed up as they were by the New York meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on October 22, the Nixon Administration reconfirmed the earlier Kennedy-Khrushchev "understanding". To many Latin Americans these talks, in effect, regularized the Soviet military presence on a Communist base in the Caribbean. Certainly they have not resulted in a permanent reduction of Soviet naval power in the Caribbean. The Russians are still standing behind their Tass statement that they have not been, and are not building their "own" military base in Cuba.

The Watch Committee recalls that the original Kennedy-Khrushchev "understanding" called for international inspection in Cuba to confirm the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles. This never took place because the Communist government in Cuba refused to allow inspection teams into the country. Taking into account the changes that have occurred since 1962, particularly the United States' loss of clear-cut strategic superiority over the USSR; the fact that on site inspection is still not permitted by Castro; and the great number of reports from members of the Cuban resistance that the Soviets are secretly installing nuclear missiles in underground installations; the Watch Committee believes that in the interest of national security prudent U.S. policymakers have little choice but to presume the worst. The Committee suggests, therefore, that appropriate preparations should be made to deal with any of the following possible Soviet courses of action:

The clandestine deployment of nuclear weapons systems into Cuba.

The overt use of Cuba as a nuclear sub-

marine base (thus doubling the on-station time in the Western Atlantic for these subs) but maintaining the fiction that Russian Polaris-type submarines are merely observing their international port-of-call rights by visiting Castro's naval base at Cienfuegos whenever necessary to meet their operational requirements.

Emphasizing Cuba's role as the political and military base for all Soviet revolutionary expansion in Latin America by letting it be known that the nuclear weapons deployed to Cuba will be used, if need be, in direct support of Chile or any other Communist regime that may come to power in the Hemisphere if they are invaded by external armed forces, whether these forces are acting unilaterally or as members of the Organization of American States.

From the Cuban Watch Committee on Cuba:

Dr. MANOLO REYES,
Dr. HERMINIO PORTELL-VILA,
Editor, *Radio Free Americas*.
Dr. GUILLERMO BELT,
Former Ambassador to the United States, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States.

GROWING DRUG PROBLEM IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY CITED BY REPRESENTATIVE MOORHEAD

HON. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Friday, January 29, 1971

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Speaker, a Senate panel recently completed a series of drug hearings in Pittsburgh.

The panel heard from many experts and community spokesmen about the evils of drugs and their debilitating nature on all community life. But the missing factors in the hearings were the drug users and addicts themselves.

Reported Al Donalson, writing in the January 24 Pittsburgh Press, takes a look at Pittsburgh's, and Allegheny County's, drug dilemma, noting last week's hearings.

We all have heard that drugs are now everybody's problem, no longer just another scourge in the ghetto.

The latest drug death figures from Allegheny County points that up with surprising equality.

The racial and sexual breakdown of Allegheny County's 38 drug deaths last year was: 19 whites, 16 male and three female; and 19 nonwhites, 16 male and three female.

These fatalities represent more than a 100-percent increase on 1969's figures. There is small doubt that the drug problem in our area is growing at a rapid rate.

As one of those interviewed in Mr. Donalson's article says, the only way the problem is going to be licked is through more money for research and technology.

At this time I would like to put Mr. Donalson's article into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the information of my colleagues:

HERE'S REAL DRUGS STORY MISSED BY PROBERS HERE

(By Al Donalson)

A team of Senate probbers headed by U.S. Sen. Richard S. Schweiker, R-Pa., came to town last week and got this word:

E 298

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—*Extensions of Remarks* January 29, 1971

Drug abuse here has reached epidemic proportions, and more federal money is needed to curb an alarming increase in the number of drug addicts in Allegheny County.

The word came from a procession of witnesses representing government, industry, law enforcement and public health agencies.

However, with the exception of an 18-year-old Ross Twp. drug user, the U.S. Senate subcommittee members didn't hear any testimony from addicts or those who have been victimized by addicts.

Schweiker said the panel tried to get drug users to testify but was "regrettably unsuccessful."

TRAGEDY ILLUSTRATED

There are hundreds of tales available which illustrate the tragedy and despair of the local drug scene.

Item, "Boss," a Hill District jitney driver, picked up two passengers and took them to Homewood.

When his passengers reached their destination, Boss didn't get his fare. His payoff was having the pair rob him of his wallet, car and clothes.

"They was junkies, man," said Boss.

"And I felt stupid walking three or four blocks damn near naked in broad daylight to get to the fire station in Homewood.

"People out there was staring at me like I was crazy," he said.

CAR SURROUNDED

Item. On a recent weekday afternoon, a white Cadillac stopped on Centre Avenue in the Hill District, and was surrounded immediately by scores of addicts.

They clustered around the car with money clutched in their hands.

The driver of the car was selling heroin. One bag for \$7, two bags at a bargain rate—\$13.

One of the buyers ripped open one of his bags and dabbed a bit of the white substance on his thumb. He then licked the powder off his thumb and told his partner:

"Yeah man, this is some good stuff, let's split."

They hurried up Centre Avenue like two kids with a new Christmas toy, leaving dozens of other buyers crowded around the car trying to place their orders before the supply ran out.

Item. A numbers writer watching this scene slowly shook his head and said:

"Man, I don't understand it with these young dudes. Can't nobody tell them nothin'."

"Like, dig, I know a young brother named Blood who's about 19. Heavy (brainy) young dude, too. The cat was going to college. But he got kicked out when he was caught mainlining."

"Like, man, the cat's habit is \$300 a day now. Square business, \$300 a day."

ALWAYS HUSTLIN'

"The dude can't even afford to sleep because he's always got to be hustlin' to get his bread (money) together for his habit."

"His Jones (urge for drugs) came down last week and he went to Oakland on a tip. He busted an old gray (white) dude in the head and took about \$1,000 from him."

"Man, Blood was hell on wheels for about three days with that grand. But his main man who was selling him good stuff got busted. So, like, Blood got some bad stuff from another nusher."

"It had a lot of flour mixed up in it. damn near died behind that stuff," said the numbers writer.

Item. A Hill District businesswoman takes a pistol out of her purse and clicks off the safety when leaving her store in the evening.

There is usually a group of at least 15 to 20 junkies hanging around the outside of her door.

"When they see the gun and hear the safety click off, they know I mean business and don't bother me," she said.

"I know it's like the Wild West to pull out a gun. But that's what it's like down here—a jungle."

Similar tales, originating in wealthy suburbs as well as the inner city ghettos, can be told.

Drug abuse is now no respecter of person. It cuts across racial and class lines in rural areas as well as the cities and suburbs.

123,000 USING IN HIGH SCHOOL

A recent survey published in a Pennsylvania Department of Health journal revealed that at least 123,000 high school students in the state are regularly using drugs.

This number, which represents about 11 per cent of the total high school student population, does not include those who only occasionally use drugs.

It was also discovered that 70 per cent of the regular users come from "upper socio-economic" families, and that 25 per cent live in rural areas.

County Coroner Cyril Wecht's 1970 report shows 19 of the 38 narcotics deaths last year in Allegheny County were suffered by whites.

In 1969, when there were 17 narcotics deaths, only three of the victims were white.

This shift of drug abuse from the ghetto to the suburbs is thought to be one of the main reasons for the increased interest in combating addiction.

Many in the black community are bitter about this late interest exhibited by whites. Their sentiments are articulated by Charles Mikell, a specialist on alcoholism and drug abuse for Community Action Pittsburgh.

"As long as the junkies were those niggers in the Hill District, no one paid any attention to the problem. But now that drugs have spread to the lily white suburbs, everyone now is very upset and wants to know why something isn't being done," Mikell, himself black, says.

"The only way the problem is going to be licked is through more money for research and rehabilitation."

ANSWERS STILL IN FUTURE

Mikell's plea for more funds for research and rehabilitation was shared by every witness who testified this week during the hearings.

However, any answers through research are probably a year or two away. The federal Harrison Act of 1914 stifled drug research in the United States.

Designed then to stem a rising flow of narcotics, the statute proved to be punitive to any physician who attempted to treat an addict. Hundreds of doctors were jailed as a result of the act.

Although the law isn't as vigorously enforced as in the past, its influence can still be felt.

IRS OKAY REQUIRED

Any scientist who wishes to do research on marijuana must be approved as a researcher by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

To be eligible, a researcher must be legally authorized by state law. Physicians with unrevoked licenses and state universities are eligible by state law.

But others, like pharmacologists, chemists and private universities must go through a tangle of bureaucratic red tape to become registered.

Once registration has been granted, the researcher then must purchase marijuana, through IRS, from the National Institute of Mental Health.

If the researcher intends to use human subjects, he must then deal with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in addition to the other two agencies.

SECURITY MEASURES PRESCRIBED

The researcher must also adopt a carefully prescribed set of security measures. If any marijuana is lost, the researcher must docu-

ment the circumstances surrounding the loss.

At all times, the researcher must maintain exact records of the amount of marijuana used, and for what purpose.

Some of these restrictions will be loosened when the recently enacted Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 becomes effective May 1.

Section I of the act guarantees protection from prosecution to certified researchers and subjects who use marijuana and other drugs in legitimate scientific research.

TRIBUTE TO THE LATE SENATOR RICHARD B. RUSSELL

SPEECH OF

HON. JAMES A. HALEY

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 25, 1971

Mr. HALEY. Mr. Speaker, it is not necessary for me, in expressing my sorrow at the death of RICHARD BREVARD RUSSELL, to extol his matchless record as a Member of the U.S. Senate. That record speaks for itself—Senator RUSSELL was always and essentially a man of the Senate. The institution became his life and he became an institution within an institution. He was the youngest Member of that body when he entered it in 1933, and at his death he was, and had been for many years, undoubtedly its most respected Member.

He was, in fact, so respected—that it was many times said that Senator RUSSELL could have been President of these United States had he not been a Southerner, and I am among those who believe that this is so. But certainly he was hugely influential in his own quiet way in his many years in the Senate. He was a champion of military preparedness and he was an internationalist—but he was never a militarist. He opposed military intervention in the affairs of other countries time and again—but as he said, when his flag was "committed" he too was "committed" to its support as chairman for 15 years of the Armed Services Committee. Nor was RICHARD RUSSELL ever a racist—he was a traditionalist—a distinction well respected by his colleagues in the Senate, of whatever party or whatever political thought.

But rather than praising RICHARD RUSSELL's career as a Senator, for it needs no praise, I would prefer to say a few words about the man, RICHARD RUSSELL, whom I had the privilege of knowing even before I came to the House of Representatives some 18 years ago.

Senator RUSSELL was a personable man with a fine, if perhaps little known, sense of humor. His wit was philosophic and sometimes caustic, often keyed to the unique southern brand of storytelling. He was courtly in a way that is seldom witnessed anymore, even in his native South. Associates recall that he found it difficult to show the slightest sign of rudeness or impatience, even when they were justified.

This was a man who applied a set of rules to most aspects of his personal life. To the end, his life-style remained

DATE 10/10/73

PAGE 1

Laird Curtails Reports On Soviet Ships in Cuba

By ORR KELLY
Star Staff Writer

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has curtailed U.S. reports about the movements of Soviet ships within Cuban waters.

In contrast to the practice last fall when the Pentagon issued daily bulletins on the movements of several Soviet vessels from one Cuban port to another, the new Defense Department policy is to reveal only when Soviet ships enter or leave Cuban waters.

Pentagon press spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said on Wednesday that three Soviet vessels — a Kresta-class light cruiser, a merchant tanker and a submarine tender — had entered Cuban waters.

Report From Moscow

Friedheim refused to confirm whether a submarine is traveling with the three surface vessels, even though both Moscow and Havana had announced that

a submarine was included in the visiting group.

The visit of a submarine tender to the Cuban port of Cienfuegos in September raised fears here that the Soviets intended to establish a base there for their Yankee-class nuclear submarines. The Yankee is similar to the American Polaris and carries 16 nuclear-tipped missiles.

There is now reportedly an understanding that the Soviets will not use Cuba as a base for offensive weapons, including the Yankee-class submarine.

Handling Publicity

Laird reportedly became annoyed last fall when his department was, in effect, handling publicity for the Soviet navy.

But he was also concerned that a refusal to tell what the Soviet ships were doing would conflict with the administration's open news policy.

He finally decided to cut out the reports of what he publicly described as "harbor-hopping" by Soviet vessels.